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INTRODUCTION.
e global presence of a country may be dened by posing the following question: to what 
extent and in what form is the country “out there”, beyond its borders? e Elcano Global 
Presence Index is a synthetic index that can answer this question by ordering, quantifying, 
and aggregating the external “projection” – (not necessarily power as such) – of countries 
along three dimensions: economic (from energy to investments), military (troops deployed 
and military equipment1), and soft (migration, tourism, science, development cooperation, 
etc.). In a sense, global presence can be the basis of power – the platform or asset base capable 
of being transformed into inuence or power – that is, insofar as the country which is 
projecting a “presence” is not only able but also willing to pursue such ends. is policy brief 
highlights the main ndings of the Elcano Global Presence Index for the Latin American 
region.2 e Index values are based on cumulative analyses appearing in topical briefs 
published since late 2015: Datamérica Global.3
e 2016 edition of the Index has been calculated for 100 countries, including the 92 top 
economies (by GDP in current US dollars measured according to the World Bank) as well as 
countries not part of this ranking which are nonetheless members of the European Union 
and/or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
e economic reforms undertaken worldwide during the 1980s and 1990s accelerated the 
globalisation process and increased the number of developing, emerging and developed 
countries interactions with other countries economically, militarily, politically and socially. 
Not all of them necessarily aim at exerting regional or global power – something that more 
traditional indexes such as the National Power Index purports to measure, – but they all do 
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1. Military capacities can be considered assets of a country, rather than an element of projection per se. In this sense they escape 
the criteria for inclusion in this Index. However, after consulting experts in strategy and defence, we decided to include this 
variable in our measurement of global presence, due to the fact that the mere number of troops deployed is an imperfect 
measure of a country’s military role on a world scale. Troops deployed is extremely sensitive to the number and location of 
conicts relative to the country deploying them; so are more a reection of a country’s situation in the world of conict than of 
any truly global role. Military capacities can therefore be interpreted as troops available to be deployed internationally which, in 
addition to troops actually deployed, are a fair reection of a country’s global presence in the military domain.
2. It should be noted that, as with other regions, Latin America’s global presence is calculated by merely adding the global 
presence of its countries. Countries’ external presence may be projected within the region (for instance, Brazil’s economic ties 
with Argentina) or outside it (as, Chilean copper exports to China). e aggregate global presence of a country is thus 
indiscriminately projected inside or outside its region. When referring to “Latin America’s global presence”, it is not implied that 
this presence is projected in toto outside the region.
3. Datamérica Global is a joint project of the Elcano Royal Institute, FLACSO - España and Estudios de Política Exterior.
LSE Global South Unit · Policy Brief Series
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk/globalsouth
Policy Brief No. 1/2018
have a foreign policy, as well as a given set of historic, geographic and cultural features that, 
all combined, produce a certain nature and extent of external projection. Ultimately, global 
presence is explained both by internal characteristics and by external strategies.
is latter – global presence, simply – is the phenomenon which the Elcano Global Presence 
Index ambitions to capture and calculate for the maximum possible number of countries, and 
this is why ten new countries are added to the project every year. North, South, developed, 
emerging and developing countries are treated on equal terms, regardless of their actual 
ambitions in world politics.
As new countries are added to the Index, the accumulating database enables regional analyses. 
e current version of the Index includes countries accounting for 98% of world GDP and 
91% of global population. At the regional level of Latin America and the Caribbean, the 15 
countries for which the Index is calculated (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela) yield 97% of the region’s GDP and host 93% of its population.
LATIN AMERICA, A PASSIVE PLAYER IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS.
Latin American countries record a low level of aggregate global presence (425 points in 2016) 
compared to countries in other regions. e 100 countries included in the project so far are 
grouped in six regions (North America, Europe, Asia and Pacic, Maghreb and the Middle 
East, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa). In this ranking, Latin America is 5th in global 
presence, after Europe (1st), North America (2nd), Asia and Pacic (3rd), and Maghreb and the 
Middle East (4th), and only before Sub-Saharan Africa (which is 6th). It has held this position 
for the last decade and a half, whereas during the nineties Latin America was the 4th-highest 
region in global presence, ahead of Maghreb and the Middle East which was 5th. It should 
be noted, moreover, that the Index for the Sub-Saharan region comprises only 10 countries 
which account for less than 80% of its GDP and 59% of its population. In the event of a 
wider sampling of this region in the Index, the gap between the aggregate global presence of 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa would close up.
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Graph 1. Global presence by region (by Index value)
GLOBAL PRESENCE CONCENTRATED IN VERY FEW COUNTRIES. 
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index
GLOBAL PRESENCE CONCENTRATED IN VERY FEW COUNTRIES. 
Just two of the 15 Latin American countries, Brazil (118 points in index value in 2016) and 
Mexico (91), account for 49% of the external projection of the whole region (Graph 2). 
Adding Chile (46 points) and Argentina (43) increases this proportion to 70%. e extent, 
evolution and nature of Latin America’s global presence are therefore pivotally determined by 
the acts of these four countries.
is explains the decline in the external projection of the region from almost 454 points in 
2013 to its current level of 425. As seen in graph 2, Brazil and Argentina record signicant 
declines in the 2013-2016 period, along with countries with lower weights in the region’s 
external projection such as Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Cuba and Bolivia.
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Graph 2. Global presence of Latin American countries (in index value)
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index
EXTERNAL PROJECTION STRONGLY DETERMINED BY PRIMARY GOODS.
More than half (54%) of Latin America’s global presence is based on its economic dimension, 
particularly on exports of primary goods (16%) and foreign direct investment (over 14%). 
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e more modest contribution of soft variables (which constitute less than 29% of total 
external projection) is distributed across the range of such variables, with a very modest 
participation of technology4 (1.2%) and education5 (1.4%). e contribution of military 
presence to intra- and extra-regional projection is similar to the other regions (with the 
exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and North America at the opposite extremes), and amounts 
to 12%.
Other developing or emerging regions such as Asia and Pacic show dierent patterns of 
external projection. Although the economic dimension’s contribution to global presence is 
similar, dierent economic variables contribute in diering degrees in other regions, with a 
much higher prole of manufactures (almost 19%), services and investments, and, in turn, a 
much lower prole of primary goods and energy. e same goes for the soft dimension, with 
a higher prole of technology, science and education in Asian countries; something that may 
be linked to their specialization in export-oriented manufactures. 
Latin American countries’ external projection declined by 28 points (from 454 to 425) 
between 2013 and 2016 (see Tables 1 and 2 below). 
During this period, there was an augment of the region’s soft projection (up 40 points), and 
a retrenchment of the military dimension (-68 points) and economic dimension (-77 points). 
e economic decline is due to a dramatic fall in two variables. On the one hand, exports of 
energy fell, resulting in a huge drop in the Index value (over -282 points6) that pertained to 
all countries in the region, but especially Colombia (-45 points), Mexico (-63), and 
Venezuela (-115). On the other hand, sales of primary goods were also hit by the cyclical fall 
of commodity prices (-207 points for the whole region).
4. Measured by the number of interrelated patent applications led in one or more foreign countries to protect the same 
invention (foreign-oriented patents).
5. Taking account of the number of foreign students in tertiary education on national territory.
6. Note well that index values for individual variables were measured on a 0-1000 scale so that they can be aggregated in their 
corresponding dimensions. is explains how the region can record a 282 point loss in the energy variable whilst the whole 
economic dimension only loses 77 points in the same period. 
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Table 1. Contributions by dimension to economic presence of Latin America and Asia and Pacic (in %)
Latin America       Asia & Pacic
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index
Table 2. Contributions by dimension to soft presence of Latin America and Asia and Pacic (in %)
Latin America    Asia & Pacic 
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index
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Not all countries, however, recorded global presence declines in this variable between 2013 
and 2016: Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and 
Panama escaped this trend. e largest declines were due to Brazil (almost -100 points), Chile 
(-51 points), and Argentina (-45 points). It should be noted that meanwhile, the external 
projection of the region through manufactures, services and investments actually increased, 
including the outstanding performance of Mexican exports of manufactures (+63 points 
from 2013 to 2016). e drop in military presence is mainly due to both the declining 
military capacities of Brazil and the repatriation of Argentine and Brazilian troops previously 
deployed for more than a decade in the UN mission in Haiti. is is expected to continue in 
the foreseeable future, thereby reducing the weight of the military dimension in the global 
presence of the region.
 
LATIN AMERICA IS NOT A COUNTRY: DIVERSE PROFILES OF GLOBAL PRESENCE.
Latin America has a rich history of regional integration initiatives with dierent objectives 
and intensities. Two of these initiatives are the Pacic Alliance, founded in 2011, and ALBA 
(Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América), founded in 2004. ese two are 
often compared on the basis of the political-ideological divide between them. To put it 
simply, the Pacic Alliance is a trade bloc made up of the neoliberal economies of the Pacic 
Coast (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), with foreign supply-orientation and intensive links 
with Asia. By contrast, ALBA, an initiative of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro, was a left-wing 
response to commercial treaties and agreements with North America. Its major economies are 
included in the Index (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela).
e Pacic Alliance, which includes Mexico, one of the region’s economic and geopolitical 
giants (the other being Brazil), projects four times more global presence than ALBA (187 
versus 45 points in 2016). It scores higher in all dimensions and variables with the exception 
of education and (more signicantly) development cooperation. is explains why the soft 
contribution to global presence is higher for ALBA than for the Pacic Alliance (40% and 
20%, respectively). On the other hand, the economic dimension makes up a larger 
proportion of the Pacic Alliance’s than ALBA’s external projections (65% and 45%, 
respectively). In both cases, the military dimension contributes around 15% of global 
presence. In the case of the Pacic Alliance, the economic contribution consists of primary 
goods, manufactures (Mexico being part of the group) and investments. In the case of ALBA, 
the single most important contribution is the economic variable of energy.
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e two blocs have coped with the economic crisis in dierent ways. e Pacic Alliance has 
strengthened its global presence (with an increase of almost 8 points between 2013 and 
2016), but ALBA has lost global presence (-11 points in the same period). Both have 
recorded a decline of economic presence (-10 points for the Pacic Alliance, -28 points for 
ALBA), although this was more severe for ALBA due to its energy specialization. Losses in the 
military dimension were, however, higher for the Pacic Alliance (-7 versus -2 points). e 
Pacic Alliance has intensied its initially low soft projection (an almost 33-point increase in 
2013-2016) while ALBA’s soft presence has plateaued.
Lastly, the divergent political and temporal origins of the two treaties, and the geographical 
dierences ought to be noted. ALBA was born as a political (and then an economic) 
counterweight to the ALCA (Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas), which was seen as a 
South-wards expansion of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). It was not until 
2009, after the disappearance of the ALCA, that the trade content of ALBA was added; the 
acronym TCP (Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos) was incorporated; and the name 
changed from Bolivarian Alternative to Bolivarian Alliance. As for the Pacic Alliance, the 
trade dimension was a key element from the beginning, as was the resolute orientation 
toward Asia. is has resulted in a greater trade dynamism. Most members of the Pacic 
Alliance border the Pacic Coast, whilst ALBA’s members are geographically scattered: – an 
important issue in trade terms and all the more so in a region with serious orographic 
obstacles to overland movement of goods and people and deciencies in transportation 
infrastructure.
CONCLUSION: GLOBAL PRESENCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.
Is the global presence of Latin America good or bad? Is it better or worse than Asia and 
Pacic? Is the Pacic Alliance better at external projection than ALBA? Well, it depends. e 
Elcano Global Presence Index is non-normative: higher levels of global presence are not 
necessarily good news (nor bad); however, it does give a measure of the role of countries and 
regions in the globalization process, hence their potential to shape that process and its 
governance structures.
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Latin America is now 5th in global presence with respect to other regions, having lost one 
rank during the globalization process. is means that, in principle, it is weaker than 
Maghreb and the Middle East and, most signicantly, than Asia and Pacic, in its position to 
inuence global governance structures, as international relations trends are actually showing.
Global presence in Latin America relies to a great extent on a short list of countries (Brazil 
and Mexico being outstanding), meaning that the number of potential global players from 
the region is limited. is concentration also aects the dimensions and variables of global 
presence. Latin America’s international role is highly determined by its outward-oriented 
primary sector (even more strongly in ALBA countries than in the Pacic Alliance). In this 
sense, its potential global role is probably also limited from a sectoral standpoint, with no 
bold actions in global governance to be expected in the elds of technology, science, or 
manufactures (with the exception of Mexico in the latter case). 
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